

**THE PROPOSED ASSOCIATED BRITISH PORTS (EASTERN RO-RO TERMINAL)
DEVELOPMENT CONSENT ORDER**

DEADLINE 4

Written summary of the Harbour Master, Humber's Oral Submissions at ISH3

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1. HMM confirmed that he would provide the following documents:
 - a. A note outlining which vessels were in the port at the time that the ExA arrived at the control centre for Immingham and details of weather conditions, the state of the tide, current speed and wind speed;
 - b. A plan which clearly shows the manoeuvring areas currently used for vessels which are manoeuvring to berth at Immingham and how it is envisaged those manoeuvring areas might be adapted for the proposed development.
2. Under agenda item 3(a) 'The management of an allision or collision incident within the Port of Immingham by the Dock Master and the Harbour Master Humber' HMM participated in response to a question from Inspector Bradley relating to where different handovers take place and the transitions between different roles by reference to a hypothetical incident.
3. HMM explained that the Outer Harbour was developed c15-18 years ago. The HMM worked closely with DFDS as to how it could be done safely. There are different rules as to when tugs are required. The degree of difficulty varies with the wind and tide.
4. HMM explained that the decision over whether additional tugs are required would normally be made on board by the pilot or PEC or master. At other parts of the dock with different vessels, the arrangements would be more prescriptive. The level of autonomy on the vessel is limited if it has a track record of not being particularly manoeuvrable.
5. In response to a question regarding the timing of making a decision to engage tug support HMM explained that the decision would be taken as early as possible based upon the forecast and before arrival. HMM explained that it is not unusual for a vessel coming up the river to decide it needs another tug or to abort a manoeuvre and go back to sea if necessary.
6. Inspector Bradley asked what would occur if a 20 knot gusting wind was expected and 30 or 40 knot blast was suddenly experienced in the middle of a manoeuvre. HMM explained that the wind speeds which the SHA sets are mean speeds. Weather forecasting gives live real time data for wind speed and gusting. If a vessel had to abort, it would go to sea and wait at anchorage or to another simpler berth.
7. HMM explained that the Dockmaster would be observing a manoeuvre. If a vessel came to grief due to extreme unexpected gusts and could not abort satisfactorily then an incident would be called in and HES would react with regards to safety of life, the vessel and the environment. The seriousness of the incident would dictate whether to start the Humber Estuary Serious Marine Emergency Plan or whether it would be possible to get the vessel to its destination berth. HMM explained that there is a plan for every end of the scale.
8. HMM explained that the master of the ship retains his responsibility for the safety of the vessel, but HES would be assisting him. The Immingham SHA would have responsibility for dealing with the incident within the limits of the SHA. If HES as a pilot on board, then HES would also have responsibility as the Competent Harbour Authority and would make decisions with the dockmaster. HES would have responsibilities to investigate and manage an incident related to its pilotage service.
9. In response to a question regarding the consequence for port operations, HMM explained that once a vessel is at a point of safety other parties become involved before the vessel can go back to sea. The other parties include the Maritime and Coastguard Agency ('MCA'), Marine Accident Investigation Branch ('MAIB') and the relevant marine classification body. The vessel

could be moved to another berth if all relevant authorities are happy. This would typically be a matter of hours rather than days. For it to be days would represent a worst case scenario.

10. In response to a query about tracking on Rep2-009 Figure 2 HMH highlighted that the reason why there were so many tracks close inshore is likely to be that the tracks of bunker barges have been included.
11. In response to a discussion relating to the Selin S incident HMH explained that 20 knots of wind is not to be described as benign and that wind was a factor in why the vessel did not turn as it wanted to. The incident was due to what the bridge team did and not due to the conditions.
12. HMH confirmed that the NRA would be part of an iterative process for the IERRT scheme. He confirmed that at this stage he was happy to move forward with the scheme and refine parameters based upon simulations and precedent of moving Ro-Ros on the river. It would be a cautious risk-based approach based upon our experience.
13. HMH explained that the closest parallel for the IERRT is the Humber Sea Terminal where limits are 25 knots in a cross wind or 2.5 knots of tide. That is a precedent for moving Ro-Ros in a tideway. This would be finessed through further simulations depending upon the vessel type.
14. When asked about whether HMH had a working hypothesis of operating limits, HMH explained that he considered that 20knots or 25knots of wind and 3 or 2.5 knots of tide would be a working hypothesis on current knowledge for when tugs might be required. He explained that, in practice, it would start with daylight, slack water and would make sure that any assumptions are correct in a cautious manner. HMH confirmed that he would provide a note on this working hypothesis, recognising that over time those limits might alter.
15. On 28 September 2023 HMH confirmed that he was content with the potential amendments to the DCO to include impact protection measures for IOT and its finger pier. He noted that the value of them had been noted in the NRA. HMH confirmed that his position should be protected on the detailed design through the protective provisions.
16. Following a discussion between the ExA and Captain McCartain, HMH confirmed that he recognised the governance structure as set out by Captain McCartain. He added that the Designated Person is available to all staff in all ranks and is a conduit for raising any safety concerns. He stated this was a key role to maintain that independence.

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